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INTRODUCTION

Health disorders engendered by hazardous, exported foods,
pesticides, drugs, and other products recently have attracted
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worldwide attention.1 The exportation of products which have
been banned or highly restricted in their country of origin or
which become hazardous in the environment of the importing nation is a popular issue for opponents of a perceived monolithic
transnational industrial complex, as well as for critics of certain
United States corporations.2 A more widely shared opinion3 is
that the United States has a moral obligation to limit foreseeable
harm from the export of potentially hazardous merchandise or at
least to supply product hazard information.4 Critics suggest that
1. Export of Hazardous Products: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980) (testimony of Anwar Fazal, President, International Organization of Consumer Unions) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearingson
Hazardous Products]; An Export Trade in Death, ADVERTISING AGE, May 15,
1978, at 99; Dowie, et al., The Corporate Crime of the Century, MOTHER JONES,
Nov. 1979, (special issue focusing on the "dumping" of banned products overseas); Weir, For Export Only: Poisons, Dangerous Drugs, ROLLING STONE, Feb.
10, 1977, at 31; See Wolterding, The Poisoning of Central America, SIERRA,
Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 63; Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Wash. Post, Feb. 25,
1980, at Al, col. 3.
2. See 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 39; Marketing and Promotion of Infant Formula in Developing Countries: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1980) (statement of
Leah Margulies, Director, Infant Formula Program, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula].
3. See, e.g., BACKGROUND REPORT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,264 REGARDING
THE EXPORT OF BANNED OR SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED SUBSTANCES,

46 Fed. Reg.

7806 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HSEP REPORT]. In February 1978, President
Carter created an interagency working group to establish a uniform hazardous
substances export policy [hereinafter referred to as HSEP], composed of representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy,
Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Justice, Labor,
State, Transportation, and- Treasury, as well as the Environmental Protection
Agency, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Export-Import Bank, Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, ACTION, Agency for International Develop-'
ment, Regulatory Council, Office of Management and Budget, Council on Environmental Quality, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, and several other Executive offices.
4. Most evaluations of a drug or chemical require sophisticated expertise and
advanced technological testing facilities not available in every nation. It has
been estimated that toxicological testing for premarket studies of a single new
substance costs approximately $100,000 at October 1980 prices. See Role of the
Information System on Transnational Corporations Regarding the Exchange of
Information on Banned Hazardous Chemicals and Unsafe Pharmaceuticals, Report prepared by the Secretariate, 7th Sess., Commission on Transnational Cor-

19831

POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MERCHANDISE

the United States has abandoned this obligation by resurrecting
the doctrine of caveat emptor5 for exclusive application to foreign

consumers. The effect of this adverse publicity upon this nation's
foreign relations,' upon the confidence of foreign buyers in United
porations, ESCOR (Provisional Agenda Item 11) at 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/90
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Report on Information Exchange]; United
States Export of Banned Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1978) (Barbara Blum, Deputy Administrator,
EPA, stating: "The whole EPA in Nigeria is one person. The Minister has one
professional and one secretary.") [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings on Banned
Products].
At least one Third World nation has taken strong measures to limit the number and type of pharmaceuticals to which its population can be exposed. Bangladesh recently announced a new policy which calls for an immediate ban on
more than two hundred "harmful" drugs and for a withdrawal by March 1983 of
more than 1500 other "unnecessary" medicines. Although the policy was enacted
primarily to safeguard the population from those drugs which were found to be
unsafe for their prescribed use and to encourage the production of technologically simple medicines by local companies or charitable organizations, the policy
has resulted in a dramatic decrease in the price of pharmaceuticals offered by
the transnational companies and a substantial foreign exchange savings. See
Cunnington, A country's right to choose, 10 DEV. F., Sept.-Oct. 1982, 15, 15. One
example of the harmful drugs currently marketed in Bangladesh is Orabolin, a
steroid used to build muscle in Soviet female athletes. The side effects include
liver tumors and fluid retention; in children, the drug initially stimulates growth
but later may result in premature stunting. The British Monthly Index of drugs
recommends that children not be given Orabolin. Nevertheless, the manufacturer of the drug promotes Orabolin for malnourished children in Bangladesh
and its leaflet claims that, despite the contrary findings, "THERE ARE NO
CONTRA-INDICATIONS IN CHILDREN." Id.
5. See W. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95 (4th ed. 1971). Recent decisions
by United States courts and agencies indicate an awareness that access to full
product quality information is critical in limiting personal, property, and economic harm to consumers. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541
F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977) (supporting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's uniform tire quality grading system). The Federal Trade Commission staff has urged a "full disclosure" approach to consumer goods in the past. See Ferguson, Consumer Ignorance as a
Source of Monopoly Power:FTC Staff Report on Self-Regulation, Standardization, and Product DifferentiationII, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv., Spring 1972,
at 55, 68. Under the assumption that "there is no inherent legal right for the
seller of a product to withhold information about his product that, if known,
would affect the consumer's decision to buy that product versus some other
seller's product," producers should supply information concerning performance
and other characteristics directly to consumers. Id.
6. See, e.g., 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products,supra note 1, at 18 app.,
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States goods and companies, and upon the United States balance
7
of trade has not gone unnoticed.
Choosing the degree and mode of regulating these exports is a
complex process. Vast differences exist between the economic,
cultural, political, and physical environments of the United States
and that of many importing nations. Regulations based upon an
analysis of the effect of a product upon the population of the
United States may fail to reflect conditions in the importing nation." Regulations which are limited to the home marketplace
may be interpreted as disregarding foreign consumer welfare.9 On
the other hand, if the regulations are too sweeping, they may be
viewed as infringing upon each sovereign nation's right to determine what is best for its citizens. To compound the difficulty of
designing an administratively practicable regulatory structure,
proposed export controls typically interface with existing regulations restricting the reimportation of contaminated goods, limiting the transport of hazardous residues via air or water, 10 and reg19 app. (letters from the Embassy of Nigeria and the Indonesian Consumers
Organization); HSEP Report, supranote 3, at 7806; World Health Organization,
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (1981) [hereinafter
cited as World Health Organization Code]. The well publicized role of the
United States as the sole dissenter to the World Health Organization Code exacerbates tension between the United States and many Third World nations. See
infra text accompanying notes 16, 183-92.
7. Id. See HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7806.
8. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products,supra note 4, at 93. Dr. Donald Kennedy, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration stated:
In our view, the relative safety and efficacy of a drug or medical device is a
composit judgment which must be made by each country based upon
many factors, such as the status of the health care system in that country,
patient compliance with dosage regimens, alternative therapies that may
be available, and other health-related and social characteristics of that nation's population. A number of diseases prevalent through the world -especially in the tropics where most of the developing nations are
found-are rare or nonexistent in this country. A drug that is useful
against such a disease may never receive adequate testing in this country
to warrant its approval here.
9. Id. See articles cited supra note 1.
10. This Note will not focus on the environmental impact resulting from the
natural global dispersion patterns of locally applied hazardous substances. At
least one case, however, demonstrates the shortcomings of current United States
export policy in this regard. In March 1978 the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) issued a final rule prohibiting the nonessential use of certain
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as aerosal propellants in containers of foods, drugs,
and cosmetics. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7807. Simultaneously, the Envi-
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ulating manufacturing processes for hazardous substances;11 as

well as with antitrust and first amendment concerns.12 Last, the
present United States administration has emphasized the need to

avoid overly burdensome regulations which might disadvantage

13
United States firms in the international marketplace.
This Note will examine the domestic and international efforts
to predict and mitigate the adverse effects of potentially hazardous merchandise.' 4 A comparison will be made bet9een a strict

ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) prohibited domestic production, processing
and use of CFCs, but did not ban export of unprocessed CFCs. Id. These actions
were taken following a determination that the substance could deplete stratospheric ozone, thereby causing, among other adverse effects, climatic changes
and increased rates of skin cancer. Id. When manufacturers of hair spray requested information regarding export of products containing CFC propellants,
the FDA advised that the shipments were lawful, provided that the items were
not prohibited by the country to which they were shipped. Id.
11. As the United States and other developed nations impose tighter domestic controls, the pressure on industry to relocate in areas with somewhat lax
environmental and worker protection laws increases. According to the industry's
1974 estimates, United States chemical firms spend 44% less on pollution controls abroad than in the United States. 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products,
supra note 1, at 7. A number of recent expansions abroad by United States asbestos manufacturers have occured because minimal safety standards were established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter
referred to as OSHA] in 1971. Id. at 8-9. Also reported are incidents of mercury
poisoning in and around a Nicaraguan plant partially owned and managed by a
United States firm. Id. at 141. See also 124 CONG. REc. 19,762 (1978) (remarks
of Rep. Obey).
12. See infra note 265.
13. Exec. Order No. 12,290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,943 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. App. § 2403nt (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 12,290];
see also President'sStatement on Signing S. 2796 into Law, 14 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRES. Doc. 2001 (Nov. 10, 1978) (authorizing continuing existence of Consumer
Product Safety Commission).
14. These products were within the scope of Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed.
Reg. 4659 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 12,264], which briefly
established a somewhat more uniform federal policy regarding the export of potentially hazardous merchandise. Exec. Order No. 12,264, enacted five days
before the close of the Carter administration, was revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,290, supra note 13, about one month later. Exec. Order No. 12,264 limited its
reach to products for which a federal agency had taken some prior regulatory
action and, thus, would have excluded items such as infant formula. Exec. Order
No. 12,264, supra at 4659-61. Alcohol, tobacco, firearms, military supplies, narcotic and psychotropic substances, nuclear fuels, hazardous production facilities,
and chemical or radioactive hazardous wastes will not be discussed in this Note.
Most nations devote special legislation to those subjects.
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regulatory reaction and the less restrictive approaches aimed at
developing access to product information.
II.

EXPORTS OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MERCHANDISE:
SELECTED EXAMPLES

A.

Infant Formula

The Twenty-Seventh World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1974
expressed concern over a decline in breast feeding in many parts
of the world.1 5 On May 21, 1981, the WHA endorsed an International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (Code).18
The vote on the resolution proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO) was 118 in favor to one opposed.1 7 The one vote
opposed was that of the United States.
Many sources suggest that mother's milk is clearly superior to
that of artificial formulas. 18 Few object to infant formula per se, a
product widely and successfully marketed in developed nations.1 9
15, World Health Organization, Res. WHA 27.43, reprinted in 2 HANDBOOK
OF REsOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXEcUTivE BOARD 58 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WHA HANDBOOK]. The matter was addressed again by the thirty-first World Health Assembly (WHA) in
May 1978. That assembly recommended that member states should, inter alia,
regulate "inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods that can be used to replace breast milk." Id. at 62. A joint WHO/UNICEF meeting on infant and
young child feeding convened October 9-12, 1979, in Geneva. Over 150 representatives of governments, United Nations organizations, inter-governmental
bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and the infant food industry attended
the meeting. 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula,supra note 2, at 2, 7, 28. In May
1980 the thirty-third WHA endorsed the recommendations of the joint WHO/
UNICEF meeting. See WHA Handbook, supra, at 54. In January 1981, the
WHO Executive Board recommended a draft of the Code to the WHA in a resolution by which it would be adopted as a recommendation. See World Health
Organization, Res. EB67.R12, reprinted in World Health Organization Code,
supra note 6, at 23; see also infra text accompanying notes 217-20.
16. World Health Organization Code, supra note 6.
17. Argentina, Japan, and the Republic of Korea abstained.
18. Studies have indicated that breast-feeding established a much closer psychological relationship between the mother and child. World Health Organization Code, supra note 6, at 10. Moreover, immunological agents are present in
human milk which are passed from the mother to the baby. Id. Human milk also
promotes growth more readily than formula and aids in the absorbtion of iron in
the infant's gastrointestinal tract. Id. Finally, and vitally for areas with severe
overpopulation, there is a positive correlation between breast-feeding and childbirth spacing. Id. See 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula,supra note 2, at 19, 50.
19. See Implementation of the World Health Organization(WHO) Code on
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Protests stem from the high probability that this otherwise safe
product will be misused in an underdeveloped nation. Economical
packaging requires that the formula be delivered in concentrated
form and prepared with water. Even industry spokesmen repeatedly warn that contaminated water supplies are common in many
less developed countries.20 Unsanitary preparation of the formula
can cause serious or fatal illness in infants, who have far less resistance to water-borne diseases than adults.2 1 Furthermore, a

mother's abandonment of breast-feeding for even a relatively
brief period decreases the probability that she will be physiologically able to resume that method.2 2 Return to this cost-free source
may be impossible by a family which, after an initial use of infant
formula, decides that the product is too expensive. It is thus common practice for many families which are only marginally able to
afford the formula to further "water down" the concentrate, resulting in undernourishment of the infant.2s
The debate outside of the health profession has resulted from
accusations that the problem is largely attributable to inappropriate marketing efforts in Third World nations by large scale producers of infant formula.24 Mass media campaigns that reduce
product information to "small print" and that are directed to an
25
unsophisticated general public have been a focus of criticism.

Even the usually innocuous distribution of free samples has been
attacked.s Unlike typical sample promotions, free samples
"hook" the mother on the formula because after the initial use
the mother may be unable to resume breast-feeding. Aggressive
promotional campaigns aimed at health care personnel as a conduit to feeding mothers contribute to the notion that "[ifnfant
formula is somehow more preferable, more sophisticated, more
modern, more Western.

' 27

Exaggerated and inaccurate allegations

Infant Formula Marketing Practices:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Internation Economic Policy and Trade and Human Rights and International
Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 WHO Code Hearings].
20. 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula, supra note 2, at 39, 124.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id. at 82-84.
25. Id. at 33, 56-59.
26. E.g., id. at 47-48.
27. Id. at 51. Practices challenged by critics of the industry include the dis-
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of corporate misconduct, however, have also been made.2 8
All parties to the controversy admit that there is a major social
basis for the decline in breast-feeding: the altered lifestyle of
mothers following increased urbanization in the Third World.29
Nevertheless, many critics outside of the infant formula industry
believe that the problem originates in a largely unregulated 3 industry's assumption that a safe and profitable item may be transferred, without variation in marketing practice or product, to a
radically different population of consumers.

B. TRIS-treated Children's Sleepwear
Until February 1977, TRIS (2-3, dibromoprophyl phosphate)
was commonly used for treating children's sleepwear to ensure

compliance with federal antiflammability standards. In 1977,
however, the National Cancer Institute released evidence which
indicated that this fire-retardant product could cause cancer in
children exposed to the TRIS-treated sleepwear 1 The Consumer

tribution of allegedly misleading literature, gift certificates for nurses, vinyl
carry-all bags with company and brand names, and posters of "chubby" babies
bearing messages such as "MAMALAC is just like Mother's Milk!" or "The Logical Alternative to Mother's Milk." Id. at 56-59.
28. E.g., id. at 76. When criticized for posting billboards that advertised its
"SMA" brand formula in Indonesia, the Wyeth International subsidiary of
American Home Products discovered that the billboards were actually high
school signs. Id. at 77. The words in the Indonesian language that translate into
"senior high school" begin with the letters "SMA." Some manufacturers have
recently taken steps to mention the superiority of breast-feeding in their advertisements. Id. at 30, 77.
29. E.g., id. at 42-43.
30. For example, in 1978 a major producer of infant formula reformulated
two of its soy products by discontinuing the addition of salt. This change resulted in products which contained inadequate amounts of chloride, an essential
nutrient. The result was a substantial number of cases of hypochloremic metabolic alkalosis syndrome in infants. A recall was initiated, but did not result in
the efficient removal of the defective products from the market. Subsequently,
the Infant Formula Act of 1980, 21 U.S.C. § 350a (Supp. IV 1980), was enacted
as an amendment to chapter IV of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
The new Act "provides for more stringent ... control over infant formula manufacturing and processing," but makes no special provision for exports. Infant
Formula Recall Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 2331 (1982) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 7).
31. Ban on TRIS (2,3-dibromopropyl)Phosphate (Chemical Flame Retardant): Hearings on S. 1503 Before the TRIS HearingPanel of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977) (statement of Barbara H.
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Product Safety Commission (Commission) subsequently designated all such fabrics as "banned hazardous substances" under
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA)32 and ordered domestic sales and distribution stopped.33 United States manufacturers of these products were required by the Commission to repurchase any unused TRIS-treated clothing from distributors,
retailers, and consumers.3 4 Faced with the accumulation of massive inventories of these banned articles, some manufacturers began exporting the goods to nations not having restrictions on
TRIS-treated products. The Commission determined that it lacked authority under the FHSA to seize or otherwise interfere with
any TRIS-treated product labeled or marked for export.3 5 In response to congressional inquiries, the Commission stated: "Very
little, if any, TRIS-treated children's sleepwear has been exported
and we do not expect this situation to change" and concluded
that it "did not believe an export policy was needed at present." 3
On May 1, 1978, however, a survey of one-half of the 110 manufacturers of children's sleepwear revealed that over 100,000 garments had already been exported and that negotiations for the
exports of thousands more garments were being conducted.37
Shortly thereafter the Commission announced that it would reverse its earlier position,3 8 creating a rush to export the products
before a possible export ban.39 In the year between the domestic
Franklin, Commissioner, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

33. 42 Fed. Reg. 18,849 (1977).
34. Id. at 18,853.
35.

HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON EXPORT OF PROD-

BY UNITED STATES REGULATORY AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1686,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 app. (1978) [hereinafter cited as BANED PRODUCTS
REPORT].

UCTS BANNED

36. Id. at 34 app.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 38 app.
39. Id. at 10. After banning domestic sales of TRIS-treated articles, the

Commission obtained an ex parte warrant to seize and condemn TRIS-treated
children's sleepwear offered for export by the Troxler Hosiery Company of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Although the district court granted Troxler's mo-

tion to quash the seizure warrant, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later
reversed, holding that the seizure and condemnation did not violate Troxler's

fifth amendment due process rights. United States v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'g, 444 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D.N.C.

1978). The appellate court refused to accept the company's argument that exportation of the goods would bring them into compliance with the Federal Haz-
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ban on TRIS-treated products and the Commission's final interpretation of the FHSA, a total of eighteen manufacturers exported, or attempted to export, TRIS-treated sleepwear. 40 Approximately 2.4 million garments, valued at $1.2 million, were
reportedly shipped abroad. 1
C. Pesticides
Approximately forty percent of the United States $7 billion annual production of pesticides is exported. 42 The WHO reports
that pesticides poison approximately one-half million persons
each year, many of whom reside in underdeveloped nations. 3
In Central America intensive cultivation and the evolution of
pests resistant to toxins have resulted in the world's heaviest per
capita use of chlorinated hydrocarbons and the more lethal organophosphates." In 1974 approximately 3380 pounds of chemicals
were applied for every square mile of land-some 4.4 pounds for
each inhabitant of this region.' 5 Agricultural workers often live,
draw water, and grow food in close proximity to fields which reardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261-1274. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that while the Act "exempts from seizure any hazardous substance appropriately
intended for export, there is no indication that articles which have been offered
for sale in domestic commerce can avoid the consequences of seizure and forfeiture by resorting to export after condemnation has occured." Id. at 44. While
the case stands as authority that exporters may not "dump" products abroad
after being forced to remove the same products from the home market, it remains uncertain to what extent the Commission has the power to regulate the
export of hazardous products which have never been offered for domestic sale,
but are manufactured solely for export. See infra text accompanying notes 7993.
40. BANNED PRODUCTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 10 (quoting 1978 Hearings
on Banned Products, supra note 4, at 15,215).
41. Id. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7807. In a similar development, over
500,000 baby pacifiers linked to choking deaths in infants were exported after
the Commission's proposed ban on June 30, 1977. 1978 Hearings on Banned
Products,supra note 4, at 2.
42. Wolterding, supra note 1, at 63.
43. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7807.
44. Wolterding, supra note 1, at 64.
45. Id. Chlorinated hydrocarbons are cumulative; they are stored in the
body, usually in fat, for years. Long term exposure results in brain and liver
damage. High levels in a woman's body will pass to infants via her milk. Organophosphates attack the nervous system. Low level poisoning produces vomiting, dizziness, tremors, blurred vision, diarrhea, and cramps. High levels produce
paralysis, convulsions, coma, and death. Id.
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ceive aerial spraying of pesticides as many as forty times per
46
season.
One pesticide, Leptophos, was never registered for use in the
United States but was produced in Texas for export. 47 About
fourteen million pounds of the pesticide were shipped to fifty
countries between 1971 and 1976.4& In 1971 and 1972 a number of
Egyptian farmers suffered hallucinations, impaired vision, and
loss of speech after exposure to Leptophos. 49 Over one thousand
water buffalo were reported to have died from exposure to the
chemical. 50 Egypt refused in 1976 to purchase further supplies of
the chemical.5 1 Despite this reaction, the manufacturer continued
to market Leptophos abroad, while advertising its safety.2
Exported pesticides also threaten the United States because
pesticide residues naturally disperse throughout the global environment.5 3 Of greater congressional concern is the likelihood that

46. Id.
47. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products, supra note 4, at 36, 48.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 48. Many incidents are attributable to faulty labeling, or labeling
incomprehensible to often illiterate workers in the importing nation. For example, in 1972 Iraq imported wheat and barley seeds for planting purposes, treated
with an organic mercury fungicide that was banned in the United States and
other developed nations. The seeds were mistakenly used in food. Over 6,000
hospitalizations, with 459 reported hospital deaths, were attributed to methyl
mercury poisoning. 1981 Report on Information Exchange, supra note 4, at 11 n.
16.
53. DDT, for example, has been used extensively throughout the world for
agricultural purposes and to eradicate pests carrying malaria and other diseases.
DDT residues are now so pervasive that scientists attempting to measure their
danger to human health are unable to locate any uncontaminated population in
the world against which to measure its effects. Henahan, Whatever Happened
to the Cranberry Crisis?-A status report on the great environmental controversies, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,Mar. 1977, at 29, 30. Fluorocarbons are another example of a chemical whose environmental effect, the depletion of the vital ozone
layer of the stratosphere, has an inescapably world-wide impact. See COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL

QuALrrY,

FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FLU-

OROCARBONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: REPORT OF FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON INADVERTANT MODIFICATION OF THE STRATOSPHERE (IMOS) (1975). Besides disper-

sal by natural means, or direct reimportation, chemicals may become
contaminants in consumer products through unsuspected routes. See, e.g., Com-

ment, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of InternationalDevelopment, 5
ECOLOGY L.Q. 321 (1976) (for example, "[D]ieldrin used in Colombian forests
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foods contaminated abroad by hazardous chemicals will be imported into the United States. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) statistics for 1977 and 1978 indicated that ten percent of
imported raw agricultural commodities contained residues of pesticides which the EPA has banned.5 4 A General Accounting Office
(GAO) report 55 and a House Subcommittee report" have concluded that the FDA's enforcement methods, which spot check
less than one percent of imports, fail to effectively eliminate
reimported contaminants.57
The domestic hazards of pesticide exports are not limited to
food contamination. The Life Science Products Company, which
operates a small plant at Hopewell, Virginia, ceased production of
the pesticide Kepone in 1975 after seventy persons associated
with the plant, including wives and children of employees, became seriously ill from overexposure." Between twelve and
twenty former workers suffered permanent disabilities.5 9 In that
year, ninety-nine percent of the domestic production of Kepone
was exported. 0
penetrates into the wood of teak trees. The trees are cut and shavings from the
logs are shipped to Canada for cow litter. The cows munch on the shavings and
the result is an unacceptable level of Dieldrin in their milk.") Id. at 353.
54. BANNED PRODucTs REPORT,supra note 35, at 28. Some products of Mexican origin, including tomatoes, beans, peppers, cucumbers, peas, cantalopes, eggplant, and squash, have been contaminated with Leptophos. Wash. Post, Feb.
25, 1980, at Al, col. 1. The EPA revoked the residue tolerance for Leptophos in
November 1976. The FDA's analytical methods, moreover, lack tests for 600
food tolerance levels of carcinogenic pesticides. Wolterding, supra note 1, at 66.
55. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Rep. No. CED-79-43,
Better Regulation of Pesticide Exports and Pesticide Residues in Imported
Foods is Essential 12-19 (1979).
56. BANNED PRODucTs REPORT, supra note 35, at 5.
57. Assuming that violations are spotted, recalls may be difficult or impossible, because the bulk of a shipment customarily is sent into the marketplace
pending the outcome of test results. In one instance, USDA inspectors in Dallas
noticed a strong "insecticide-like" smell in a shipment of cabbage imported by a
businessman with a history of dealing in contaminated products. The FDA allowed the cabbage to go to market, despite USDA's complaint. Tests later indicated the presence of illegal levels of BHC, a carcinogenic pesticide, the EPA
registration for which had been cancelled in 1976 at the request of its manufacturer, Hooker Chemical. The cabbage was beyond the reach of recall. Wolterding, supra note 1, at 66.
58. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products, supra note 4, at 69.
59. See C. MUSGROvE, KEPONE POLLUTION: A SUMMARY REvIEw 1 (1978).
60. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products,supra note 4, at 68. Examination of
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D. Pharmaceuticals
Approximately eighty-five percent of the world's pharmaceutical products originate with multinational enterprises based in developed nations.6 1 The United Nations Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC) has expressed concern that this concentration
of marketing power inhibits the investigation of exported drugs
which do not meet the same quality control requirements for
drugs in domestic use.62 Despite strict FDA regulation of domestically available drugs," United States law concerning exports has
permitted "adulterated, contaminated, unsafe, ineffective, or misbranded products [to be] dumped on the market in Latin
America, Africa, and Asia. . .when the shelf-life of a batch of a
'
product has expired, and it is no longer safe and effective."64
Chloramphenicol is a potent antibiotic used in this country
only against life-threatening diseases such as typhoid fever. Its
application must be confined to critical cases because of possible
side effects producing aplastic anemia, which has a thirty percent
to sixty percent mortality rate.6 5 In the United States, informational materials accompanying a drug must caution whether it is
the plant, discharges of which were responsible for the contamination of
fisheries in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, was conducted by the Senate
Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation the following
year. S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Subcommittee concluded
that under existing law, plants manufacturing pesticides solely for export did
not have to comply with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act's provision regarding registration of production facilities; see infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
61. International Co-operation and Co-ordination Within the United Nations System: Consumer Protection. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council (prov. agenda item 18) at 23, U.N. Doc. E/1981/75
(1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 International Co-operation Report].
62. Id. at 24.
63. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-381 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
64. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 11611 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1323 (1978) (statement of Milton
Silverman, senior faculty, health policy program, University of California, San
Francisco) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Drug Regulation Hearings]. Dr. Harold
Hubbard, Chief of the Food and Drug Control Section, Division of Disease Control, Pan American Health Organization, stated that there are few Latin American countries presently capable of evaluating safety and efficacy claims of products that are now being imported into their health services. Id. at 1330-31.
65. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products, supra note 4, at 51.
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to be used only for minor infections.6 6 Despite such controls,

chloramphenicol has been exported to Latin America for use
against such routine diseases as measles, tonsillitis, chicken pox,
and the common cold and has been sold without warnings of its
67
possible side effects.
Conversely, some beneficial exports may have been prematurely
banned. The controversy surrounding the FDA's decision not to
approve domestic use of Depo Provera, an injectable long-term
contraceptive, thereby automatically barring any current export,68
illustrates the incongruency of domestic and foreign cost-benefit
equations. The use of Depo Provera was rejected after researchers
found evidence that it might produce cancer and birth defects. 9
Many severely overpopulated Third World nations, although recognizing the adverse effects of the contraceptive, nevertheless re70
quested permission to import the drug.
III. UNITED STATES MECHANISMS FOR EXPORT REGULATION

An array of inconsistent export statutes wielded by sometimes
inattentive agencies have made these incidents of product misuse
and misapplication possible. Despite congressional and executive
efforts to construct a uniform federal policy concerning exports of
66. Id.

67. Id. at 51-52. Lomotil, produced by the G.D. Searle Company in the
United States, provides relief of diarrhea associated with mild stomach disorders. In developing countries, where contaminated water supplies are often the
norm, the use of Lomotil may only mask symptoms of extremely serious diseases
such as bacillary dysentery and enteritis. Id. Such diseases were the leading
causes of death in Paraguay, Guatamala, and El Salvador in 1970 and 1971. Id.
In addition, Lomotil is especially hazardous for use by children. Id. The distinction between an appropriate and a toxic dose is difficult to ascertain. Lomotil
can only be purchased by prescription in the United States. In one developing
nation, Lomotil has been marketed over the counter in packages displaying the
message: "Used by astronauts during Gemini and Apollo space flights." Id. It
has also been recommended for use in young children. Id.; see Muller, Lomotil:
a Case of Moral Incontinence, 73 NEw SCIENTIST 786, 786 (1977).
68. See infra text accompanying note 101.

69. Depo Provera "is approved for use in the United States only for palliative treatment of endometrial and renal cancer." HSEP Report, supra note 3, at
7807. For a detailed analysis of the drug's uses, and the controversy over its use
in this country and abroad, see 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products, supra
note 1, at 166-70, 250-369 apps.
70. Id.
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potentially hazardous merchandise, 71 this policy does not presently exist. Nevertheless, these efforts have filled glaring gaps in
the regulatory skeleton. The following federal agencies divide responsibilities for those hazardous exports with which this Note is
concerned:7"
(1) The Consumer Product Safety Commission, which administers three recently amended statutes-the Consumer
Product Safety Act (CPSA),7 the Flammable Fabrics Act
(FFA), 4 and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA) ,15

(2) The Food and Drug Administration, which derives its
authority from the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FD&CA)'76 and
(3) The Environmental Protection Agency, which manages
programs under the authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA) 77 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)7

71. See infra text accompanying notes 134-57.
72. Pursuant to the Export Administration Act, the Department of Commerce has general authority over all exports. See infra note 136.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). The CPSA governs
safety standards for consumer products: articles used in and around a residence,
school, or for recreation for the personal use, consumption, or enjoyment of the
consumer, except tobacco, motor vehicles, pesticides, boats, ammunition, aircraft, foods, drugs, cosmetics, or medical devices. Id. § 2052(a)(1).
74. Id. §§ 1191-1204 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Items within the scope of the
FFA include wearing apparel, fabric, or related materials.
75. Id. This statute includes substances which are (1) irritants, strong sensitizers, or toxic, corrosive, flammable, combustible, or which generate pressure
and which may cause substantial personal injury, and (2) toys. The Commission
also exercises authority under the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-1476 (1976), which establishes standards for the special packaging of
household substances with which children are likely to come into contact, and
the Refrigerator Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1214 (1976), which requires
household refrigerators shipped in interstate commerce to be equipped with
safety locks allowing them to be opened from the inside.
76. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). The FDA governs the use
of biological products under 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1976), and regulated cosmetics,
new drugs, medical devices, and drugs approved for use in the United States

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-363 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
77. Id. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). TOSCA covers chemical substances or mixtures except those occurring in pesticides, tobacco, nuclear materials, and firearms.
78. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). The Act covers substances
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Although no consistent principles have emerged from the current amendments, Congress has avoided extremes. Congress instead has chosen a moderate approach consisting of notification,
labeling, disclosure, and monitoring requirements, with limited
bans on the export of the more dangerous items.
A.

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) 9 in
1972 with the express aim of protecting the public from unreasonable risks of product-related injury. The CPSA provides for evaluations of product safety, development of safety standards, bans
on unreasonably hazardous items, and research into the causes
and prevention of injuries and deaths due to these articles." The
Consumer Product Safety Commission"' is an independent federal agency possessing broad regulatory powers. The Commission
has wide-ranging authority to enter locations where consumer
products are manufactured, transported, or sold to inspect the
books, records, and products of any manufacturer, private labeler,
82
or distributor.
Prior to 1978, the CPSA, the FFA, and the FHSA provided
broad exemptions for the foreign sales of domestically produced
articles. The most exacting restrictions upon exports were those
of the FHSA, which provided that any product could be exported
if it was (1) in a package branded in accordance with the specifications of the foreign purchaser, (2) labeled in accordance with
the laws of the foreign country, (3) labeled on the shipping package as intended for export, and (4) in fact exported." The CPSA
8' 4
and FFA require a manufacturer to have an "intent to export"
as a prerequisite for exemption of a shipment from their coverage.
By November 1978 public pressure and judicial reluctance to construe broadly the "intent to export" requirement influenced Congress to amend the CPSA, FFA, and FHSA.8 5 Section 2067 of the

or mixtures for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, or for
use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or dessicant.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. EI 1979).

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2051(b) (1976).
§ 2053(a) (1976 & Supp. Dm 1979).
§ 2065 (1976).
§ 1265(a).

84. Id. § 2067.
85. Consumer Product Safety Authorization Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-631,
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CPSA now exempts from coverage those products "manufactured,
sold or held for export."8 6 Section 2067(a) also prohibits noncon87
forming products from being distributed in domestic commerce.
Furthermore, shipments can be halted, regardless of their primary destination, if the Commission determines that the export
"presents an unreasonable risk of injury to persons residing
within the United States."' Section 2067(b) introduces measures
designed both to facilitate enforcement of these safeguards and to
provide more meaningful notice to foreign consumers. The "intent to export" labeling requirement remains in force. In addition, exporters must now notify the Commission thirty days in
advance of shipment of products which do not comply with an
existing consumer product safety standard," or which have been
declared to be banned hazardous substances under the Act.9 0 The
Commission then will alert the appropriate governmental agency
in the importing country of the impending shipment and inform
that agency of the basis for the United States safety standard or
ban. 1 Substantially identical provisions are contained in the
FHSA92 and FFA.9 3
B.

Food and Drug Administration

Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act94 the FDA can bar or
remove from the market products which fail to meet designated
standards. 5 These standards regarding adulteration or misbranding of products will not, however, be applied to any product if:
(1)

the product meets the specifications of the foreign

§§ 1-11, 92 Stat. 3742.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a) (1976 & Supp. M 1979).
87. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 53-60.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

15 U.S.C. § 2067(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
15 U.S.C. § 2056, 2058 (1976).
Id. §§ 2057, 2058.
See 16 C.F.R. § 1019.7 (1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1273(d) (1976 & Supp. H 1979).
Id. § 1202(c).
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. M 1979).

95. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1976) (license to manufacture biological products); 21
U.S.C. §§ 361-62 (1976) (standards of adulteration and misbranding for cosmetics); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1976) (new drugs); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1976 & Supp. HI
1979) (adulterated or misbranded food or drugs); 21 U.S.C. §§ 341-343 (foods:
standards of identity, adulteration, misbranding) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979); 21
U.S.C. §§ 360(d)-360(f), 360(h) (medical devices) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
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purchaser,
(2) the product is not in conflict with the laws of the country
to which it is being exported,
(3) the product is labeled on the shipping package as intended for export, or
(4) the product is not in fact sold or offered for sale in the
United States."
FDA export policy is, however, in the words of its own Commissioner, "so internally inconsistent that it is very hard to know
what the policy is."'

7

Briefly that policy is as follows:

(1) Medical devices, although exempted under section
381(d)(1), remain subject to restrictions in section 381(d)(2).
Devices that do not comply with performance standards, fail
to receive pre-market clearance, or are banned cannot be exported unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services
determines that the export is "not contrary to the public
health and safety and has the approval of the country to
which it is intended for export."9 8
(2) Biological products (viruses, serums, toxins, vaccines,
blood, etc.) are regulated without differentiation between domestic and foreign markets; there can be no export of those
products not approved for sale in the United States.99
(3) Foods, cosmetics, and drugs manufactured for human use
that are currently approved for distribution in the United
States may be exported without a permit so long as the four
criteria of section 381(d)(1) are met.100
(4) New drugs, not yet approved for domestic use by FDA,
may not be exported for commercial use under any circumstances.10 ' Investigational use by a foreign purchaser may be
authorized by FDA upon the agency's receipt, through the
State Department, of a formal
request from the government
10 2
of the importing nation.
(5) New animal drugs may be exported as long as they are
96. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).

97. 1978 Drug Regulation Hearings,supra note 63, at 194 (statement of Dr.
Donald Kennedy).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(2) (1976).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1976).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).

101. Id. § 355(a) (1976).
102. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1982).
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not unsafe
within the meaning of section 360b of the
3
10

FD&CA.

C.

Environmental Protection Agency

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)104 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA) 10 5 invest the EPA with authority to register, set standards for, and
remove or suspend certain chemicals and pesticides from the domestic market. Both statutes contain provisions regarding exports
of regulated substances.
An examination of FIFRA prior to its 1978 amendments reveals
why so many lethal pesticides passed into the unprepared hands
of foreign consumers. Prior to 1978 FIFRA exempted from its registration, labeling, or branding requirements any product "intended solely for export.. . and prepared or packed according to
the specifications or directions of the foreign purchaser." 10 6 The
EPA, however, was required to forward to foreign governments
and international organizations a simple notice of the registra107
tion, cancellation, or suspension of any pesticide.
The 1978 amendments to FIFRA10 s have significantly tightened
the agency's control over pesticide exports. Although exported
pesticides maintain their technically exempt status, exporters
must now comply with the registration and record-keeping requirements and the extensive labeling provisions of the Act.109 In
1 requiraddition, exports are now subject to detailed regulations 10
ing that the pesticide be labeled in a form "likely to be noted by
the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase
and use," and bear the legend "Not Registered for Use in the
United States of America." ' The FIFRA provision that requires
103. 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. M 1979).
104. 7 U.S.C. 136-136y (1976 & Supp. 1m 1979) (current version at 7
U.S.C.A. § 136-136y) (1980 & West Supp. 1982).

105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 136o (1976 & Supp. mI 1979). Firms manufacturing such
products for export were not exempt from the Act's basic record-keeping requirements. Id. § 136f.
107. Id. For a review of the effectiveness of this system, see infra text accompanying note 135.
108. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 833.
109. 7 U.S.C. § 136(p) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
110. Id. § 136(q).
111. Id. As a result of the requirements imposed by §§ 136(p) and 136(q), all
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the EPA to notify foreign governments and international agencies
of any regulatory action1 12 has been broadened; upon request by
the importing nation this notice must now include background information related to the agency's decision and specifications of
approved pesticides which might be used in lieu of the restricted
substance. 1 3 Prior to shipment of any unregistered pesticide, the
FIFRA requires foreign purchasers to sign a statement indicating
that they understand the pesticide is not registered for use by
EPA and thus cannot be sold in the United States. 114 A copy of
this signed statement must be forwarded to the government of
the recipient nation. 1 5
The Toxic Substances Control Act," 6 enacted in 1976, provides
for the development of data concerning the effects of chemical
substances on human health and upon the environment. Pursuant
to sections 4 through 7 of TOSCA," 7 the EPA is given extensive

exported pesticides, devices, and active ingredients used in producing pesticides
must, under current regulations, bear labels which contain:
1. EPA Establishment Numbers;
2. Ingredient statements;
3. Name and address of the producer or registrant;
4. Statements of net weight and measure;
5. If highly toxic, skull and crossbones and information for practical treatment in case of poisoning;
6. Warning and caution statements;
7. No false representations;
8. No imitation of other products, and
9. In the case of an unregistered pesticide, the conspicuous and readable
statement "Not Registered for Use in the United States of America."
EPA has interpreted the "likely to be read and understood by the ordinary
individual" language of § 136(q) to require warning and caution statements, ingredient lists, poison warnings, and treatment information, and the "Not Registered for Use in the United States" legend to appear bilingually on the exported
product's label. 45 Fed. Reg. 50,275 (1980).
112. 7 U.S.C. § 136(g).
113. Id. § 136o(b).
114. Id. § 136o(a).
115. Id. § 136o(a)(2). The exporter must acquire this final acknowledgement
before the product is released for shipment. 45 Fed. Reg. 50,274 (1980). Such
statement need only be prepared annually for the first shipment of each unregistered pesticide to a particular purchaser for each importing country. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
117. Id. §§ 2603-2606 (1976). EPA may require testing, impose pre-market
notice requirements, require labeling, and limit or prohibit sales if tests provide
a reasonable basis from which to conclude that unreasonable risks to health or
the environment exist. EPA may also, by obtaining a court order, seize a sub-
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authority to regulate those chemicals which it determines pose an
unreasonable risk of injury. A broad export provision1 1 s exempts
those chemical substances which are manufactured for export
from all regulations under TOSCA except those concerning the
reporting and retention of information.11 9 This "hands off' attitude toward the welfare of foreign consumers is accentuated by
the succeeding provision120 which provides that any exported substance that presents an unreasonable risk of injury to human
health or to the United States environment will be subject to
TOSCA's full requirements. The TOSCA, however, does not leave
the importing nation entirely without data concerning the chemicals that it imports. Section 12(b) of the TOSCA 12 2 requires any
person who intends to export a chemical for which the submission
of data has been required under the TOSCA 12 2 or for which certain regulatory actions have been taken1 23 to notify EPA of that
intention. The EPA is then required to notify the foreign government of the nature of the action taken or upon that government's
request, of the availability of background information concerning
1 24
that substance.
D.

Proposals for Change in United States Policy

Enacted over a period of forty years, and often responding to
particular incidents of consumer harm, these United States statstance which poses an imminent hazard.
118. Id. § 2611(a).
119. Id. § 2607.
120. Id. § 2611(a)(2).
121. Id. § 2611(b).
122. See id. §§ 2603, 2604(b).
123. See id. §§ 2604-2606. EPA's general policy is not to require notice of
export for articles unless the Agency has already specifically so required in the
context of individual rulemakings or actions concerning those specific items. 45
Fed. Reg. 82,846 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 707).
124. Id. § 2611(b). The EPA's current regulations concerning export notices
apply to PCBs, CFCs, 2,3,7,8-TCDD (tetra chloridibenzo-p-dioxin), and asbestos, the articles currently restricted under § 7 of TOSCA, as well as any future
items falling under the appropriate section. The notification procedure under

TOSCA is analogous to that of FIFRA. For each affected chemical substance
exporters must submit annually a single notice for each country to which the
chemical is sent. Such notice must include the exporter's name and address, the
name of the chemical substance, the export date, the country of import, and the

section of TOSCA under which EPA has taken prior action regarding the substance. 45 Fed. Reg. 82,844 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 707).
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utes address a wide variety of product categories, shipment
routes, and uses. Although the recent restructuring of the EPA's
and the CPSC's authority over exports of potentially hazardous
merchandise has increased their control over those shipments, the
situation, in the eyes of many critics, remains unacceptably
1 25
chaotic.
The Reagan administration is considering further retreats from
Carter administration export policies. Most notably, the State
Department has proposed the almost complete elimination of the
current preshipment notification rules.1 26 In response to President
Reagan's request for recommendations following his revocation of
Executive Order 12,264,127 the State Department echoed the chief
executive's belief concerning the detrimental effect of hazardous
substance export regulations on domestic industry's competitiveness in the international marketplace. A proposed statute would
replace the EPA's current annual notification procedure for shipments of banned or restricted goods1 28 with a procedure that
would provide "brief summary information" to foreign governments or international organizations following pertinent domestic
regulatory action. This notice could occur years before the product's actual export. 129 Furthermore, as part of its overall anti-regulatory approach, the administration has reduced the budget of
the CPSC thirty percent 3 0 and is seeking to cut in half the staff
and the budget of EPA during the next two years. 1 ' It is reasonable to assume that the more limited capabilities of these agencies
will be focused on issues of more immediate concern to the domestic population.
Although legislative momentum accompanying the potentially
hazardous merchandise issue has not disappeared,3 2 it appears

125. See, e.g., 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 146
(statement of Angela Blaclkell, attorney, Public Advocates).
126. Mayer, Easing of Hazardous Exports Studied, Wash. Post, Sept. 9,
1981, at Al, col. 1.
127. Exec. Order No. 12,290, supra note 13.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 104-24.
129. Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1981, at A16, col. 1.
130. Id., May 31, 1981, at D8, col. 1.
131. Shabecoff, Funds and Staff for Protecting Environment May Be
Halved, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
132. H.R. 6587, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 Hearings on
Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 215. Congressman Michael Barnes, who

introduced H.R. 6587 as an amendment to the Export Administration Act, has
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that the consensus within the Government remains that each nation should decide which products it shall import. Information
exchange systems, therefore, will become the main thrust of any
politically viable United States hazardous substance export
policy.

133

There are two prerequisites for the success of this approach.
First, adequate data must exist about the product's risks and
benefits. Second, this information must be accessible to the overseas decision maker. President Carter's short-lived Executive Order 12,2644 and a recent congressional proposal, H.R. 6587,135
reintroduced the measure as H.R. 2439, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Telephone
interview with Lenora Odeku, office staff member of Rep. Barnes (Feb. 1, 1982).
133. THE BANNED PRODUCTS REPORT, supra note 35, presents the view that
notification procedures are the only feature of the United States hazardous substance export policy and ignores this nation's technical superiority in terms of
data analysis, as well as the limitations of information exchange systems. Moreover, it sidesteps the moral obligations incumbent upon the possessor and originator of such information. The author of this Note believes that, given the status of the progress made to this point, concentration upon refinement of what is
probably the least commercially intrusive, and therefore, the most politically viable form of export supervision, is a realistic strategy for persons concerned with
this issue.
134. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14.
135. H.R. 6587, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). A GAO evaluation of the State
Department's role in EPA's pesticide notification program found significant defects in the implementation of the EPA's pesticides export policy. Letter from
Henry Eschwege, Director GAO, to Douglas Costle, reprinted in BANNED PRODucTs REPORT, supra note 35, (app. V). The GAO found that while the EPA had
cancelled or suspended registrations of fourteen pesticides, the agency's policy
was to notify foreign governments only when final action was taken. As a result,
notification was sent concerning only five regulatory actions. Information was
entirely omitted for a number of extremely widely used suspected carcinogens,
chlordane and heptachlor, because they were suspended from registration in
1975, but not cancelled until 1978. 1978 Hearings on Banned Products, supra
note 4, at 163. Even when notification was released, the GAO found substantial
evidence that notices sent through the State Department often failed to reach
their foreign destinations. See id. at 81. In one example, an embassy official told
the GAO that he failed to forward such notices because such action might adversely affect United States exports to that nation. Id. Inadequacy in the content or form of these notices was also said to be prevalent. Id. Similarly, lack of
coordination in FDA notification has been conceded by its Commissioner. Id. at
110 (statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, FDA Comm'r, Public Health Serv.,
Dep't of HEW). Although it is not required to maintain any such procedures by
statute, that agency's ad hoc notification techniques take several forms. The Bureau of Drugs communicates directly with several nations, as well as with WHO.
Id. at 112. Although WHO and the State Department may be notified of a regu-
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are examples of regulatory systems which derive their effectiveness from greater uniformity in export notification procedures.
Increased uniformity in this respect would contribute to the formulation, accessibility, and usefulness of information concerning
potentially hazardous substances without adding substantially to
the regulatory burden. The resulting improvement in efficiency
may help remedy serious defects in the existing notification
procedures.
Despite its shortcomings, Executive Order 12,264 represents
the highwater mark of United States hazardous substance export
policy. The order was composed of three elements-hazard notification, an annual summary of regulatory actions, and limited export controls.
Export controls, the most restrictive element of the order,
proved to be the most controversial.136 Although the order contemplated that this country's obligations would be chiefly satisfied through its notification procedures, it recognized that for certain articles, positive action to curtail exports might be needed as
latory action, there often is no indication that such information has been received. BANNED PRODUCTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 23.
136. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14, § 1-3, 46 Fed. Reg. 4662. Export
controls under the Order were enacted under authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2422 (1981). This Act is the successor to the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2422
(1980). In a memorandum dated Jan. 30, 1979, Leon Ulnan, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, advised the Department of Commerce that the 1969 statute gave the President authority to control exports of
hazardous substances for reasons of foreign policy. 45 Fed. Reg. 53,768 (1980).
By memorandum dated Apr. 11, 1980, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Ulman advised the Working Group that the President's ability to control such
products to significantly further the foreign policy interests of the United States
remained intact under the 1979 statute. Id. Section 6(a)(1) of the 1979 Act authorizes the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation of any goods, technology, or other information ... to the extent necessary io further significantly
the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international
obligations." The memorandum noted that the purposes of foreign policy controls are more vague than national security controls, and therefore might sanction a wide variety of actions. Industry representatives have argued that the
1979 statute evinces an intention to use the Act as a punitive device, for instance, against nations like South Africa, rather than as a means to expand the
scope of export licensing by the Department of Commerce. See Letter to Ed
Cohen, Deputy Director, Office of Consumer Affairs, from Jack D. Early, President, National Agricultural Chemicals Association, reprinted in 1980 Hearings
on Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 385.
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a last resort.13 7 The Secretary of Commerce, therefore, in cases of
"extremely hazardous substances... which represent a substantial threat to human health or safety or to the environment...
export of which would cause clear and significant harm to the foreign policy interests of the United States" could require an export
license.138 The license approval procedure was particularly cumbersome"3 9 because of the procedures required by the Export Administration Act.140
The annual notification provision was to complement the other
notification provisions of the order."" Compiled by the Regulatory Council,1 42 it summarized all proposed and final regulatory
actions related to products within the order's scope. The summary was to be published in the Federal Register and distributed
by the State Department to appropriate foreign officials and international organizations.143
The working group considered the order's hazard notification
137. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7811.
138. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14, § 1-301, 46 Fed. Reg. 4662.
139. An interagency task force chaired by the Department of State, and including the Department of Commerce, the EPA, CPSC, FDA, the Office of the
Special Trade Representative, and other relevant agencies, was to be formed. Id.
§ 1-304, 46 Fed. Reg. 4662. This group would select, from all substances banned
or restricted in this country, those to be included on a Commodity Control List.
That selection would be made on the basis of the type, extent, severity, likelihood, and duration or irreversibility of damage, the potential for harm to neighboring nations and the global commons, the availability of alternatives to the
substance, the benefit attached to the product's use, its availability from other
sources, and other factors. Id. § 1-305, 46 Fed. Reg. 4663. If the task force and
State Department both concluded that the export of the substance would be
harmful to the nation's foreign policy interests, and that export control would
benefit those interests, the State Department would recommend to the Commerce Department that the substance be placed on the Commodity Control List.
Id. § 1-306, 46 Fed. Reg. 4663. The Commerce Department would then apply the
procedures mandated by §§ 3, 4, and 6 of the Export Administration Act, 50
U.S.C. app. 2401-2422, in evaluating the recommendation. Id. § 1-307, 46 Fed.
Reg. 4663. Section 6 of the Act would have required consultation with affected
industries as well as notification by the President to Congress of the imposition
of controls, with a report on the basis for their imposition. Id. Once the hazardous substance was placed under export controls, any intended exporter would
need to apply to the Department of Commerce for a license to export the product. Id. § 1-301(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 4662.
140. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2422.
141. See HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7811.
142. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14, § 1-401, 46 Fed. Reg. 4663.
143. Id. § 1-403, 46 Fed. Reg. 4664.
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provisions its core." No substantive changes were proposed in
the recently amended notification procedures. 4 " Rather, the
group stressed the need for greater procedural uniformity in the
notification process 1' 6 and thus designated the State Department
as the official conduit for notices.1 4 7 That department and the va-

rious agencies involved were to work together to determine which
persons in the United States would be contacted for information
about product risks and to locate "opposite numbers" in foreign
governments. 4" The order also set a uniform standard for the
contents of such notices. At a minimum, information forwarded
by the State Department was to include:
(1) the name of the hazardous article to be exported,
(2) a summary of any agency's regulatory actions regarding
that substance, including a timetable for any further action,
and
(3) a summary of the potential risks to human health or
safety or to the environment, which formed the basis for the
agency's action.' 49
The order was not without significant flaws. First, it fully excluded two major categories of potentially hazardous merchandise
from its scope-hazardous production facilities and products
"subject to unsafe circumstances abroad" (e.g. infant formula). 50
Criticism was also directed at the inadequacy of the notification
procedure of the order, which was felt by some to be "virtually
certain to prove ineffective.'

5'

Critics noted that many sub-

stances for which notification alone was to be provided were those
substances for which a similar approach had already been deemed
inadequate to protect the United States population. Second, brib144. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7812.
145. Id. at 7811.
146. Id.
147. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14, § 1-201(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 4661.
The order did not, however, preclude an agency from directly contacting a foreign government as a supplement to the standard State Department conduit. Id.
§ 1-202, 46 Fed. Reg. 4661.
148. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7811.
149. Exec. Order No. 12,264, supra note 14, § 1-201(b)(1)-(3), 46 Fed. Reg.
4661.
150. HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7817.
151. 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 231.
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ery of foreign governmental officials 152 could obliterate any effect
that simple notification to those officials might have.
H.R. 6587153 provided that no product banned, disapproved, or
restricted in use within the United States could be exported without a license. The license could be issued to an exporter only
upon a joint finding by the Secretary of Commerce and the head
of the agency having jurisdiction over the product:
(1) that the government of the importing country requested
the product,
(2) that the exporting company fully informed the importing
government and foreign consignee of any restrictions on the
sale of the product in the United States and of the risks
posed by the product,
(3) that the potential benefits of the product outweighed the
possible hazards,
(4) for a product restricted in the United States, that the
importing nation subjects it to similar restrictions,
(5) that the product effectively provides information to protect that nation's consumers, in light of language barriers, illiteracy, or marketing practices in the importing nation, and
(6) that the product is not an ingredient of a banned product
being shipped for the purpose of manufacturing that banned
product in another nation. 5
The Barnes bill, as compared to Executive Order 12,264, has
drawn less fire from environmentalists. Most criticism has been
directed at inadequate provision for public participation in
agency determinations concerning export licenses. 155 Critics argue
that without public input the agency will be biased because the
only input to the agency will be that of the very firms promoting
the sale of the regulated product. 5 6 Even proponents of the most

152. See, e.g., id. at 184 (Form 8-K report of the Upjohn Company to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, indicating payments of $4,098,000 to em-

ployees of foreign governments, or intermediaries, in connection with sales).
153. H.R. 6587, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1980.

154. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, §§
2(3)(A)(i)-(iii), 2(3)(B), 2(4), 2(5) (codified as amended in scattered sections of

50 U.S.C.).
155. 1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products,supra note 1, at 221 (statement

of Public Citizen Health Research Group); id. at 391 (letter to Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade from Consumers Union).
156. Id. at 221, 391.
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extensive export regulations have conceded, however, that the
bill's third criterion, cost-benefit analysis, would be extremely difficult to implement. 157 From industry's standpoint, the wording of

the proposed amendment reaches too wide a range of domestically regulated products. Greater selectivity in the coverage of the
bill would increase its effectiveness in controlling hazards of international significance.
E. Executive Order No. 12,114-A Model for Export Policy
Executive Order 12,114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions (the Order),158 is a recent clarification of the
United States Government's position regarding the welfare of foreign consumers. Although the Order expressly states that it "furthers the purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act"
(NEPA), 59 it rejects NEPA as the source of its authority.60
Its legal origins notwithstanding, the order comports with the
policies articulated by NEPA, as tempered by foreign policy considerations. Federal agencies involved in actions which "significant[ly] harm . . . the [natural and physical] environment" 16
'
must issue regulations implementing an environmental review
procedure. 1 2 Programs subject to review include those which affect the global commons,"" any foreign country not participating
with the United States in the program, 64 a foreign nation receiving products strictly regulated in the United States because of
toxic 65 or radioactive properties, 6 6 or a protected global
157. Id. at 221.
158. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Exec.

Order No. 12,114] reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, app. 597 (Supp. III 1979).
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). The purposes of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA) are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;

to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the under-

standing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. Id. § 4321.

160. Exec. Order No. 12,114, supra note 158, § 1-1.
161. Id. § 3-4.
162. Id. § 2-1.
163. This term encompasses any areas "outside the jurisdiction of any nation
(e.g., the Oceans or Antarctica)." Id. § 2-3(a).
164. Id. § 2-3(b).
165. Id. § 2-3(c)(1).
166. Id. § 2-3(c)(2).
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resource. 167

The Order provides seven broad exemptions to the required review procedure. These exemptions parallel those currently employed by NEPA. 6l These exemptions grant agencies enormous
flexibility in their review processes. One commentator has suggested that the Order, in providing this discretion, allows circumvention of NEPA's purposes."' 9
The Order provides, nonetheless, a model for governmental review of exports, and obliges agencies to consider their responsibility for environmental review. It thus encourages a thorough analysis of the effect of a decision to export. The Order, however,
provides no standard to determine whether intended exports are
acceptable. The Order suggests that those responsible for the creation and promotion of a product analyze its environmental impact. These parties, whether manufacturers or federal agencies,
are more likely to have the technical and personnel resources necessary for analyzing drugs, pesticides, industrial chemicals, and
17 0
consumer products than are the recipients of the merchandise.

Proponents of more extensive export regulations have offered
comprehensive and detailed plans for stopping the harm inflicted
on foreign consumers by products originating in the United
States.1711 Because the trend is toward decreasing regulation, these
167. Id. § 2-3(d).
168., Id. § 2-5(a). Section 2-5(a) exempts agencies from environmental review
requirements for:
1. actions not having a significant effect on the environment outside of the
United States, as determined by the agency;
2. actions taken by the President;
3. actions involving national security, or occurring "in the course of armed
conflict";
4. intelligence activities and arms transfers;
5. routine export licenses, permits, or approvals;
(The effect of this exemption is to omit from the scope of review an export
transaction where the only federal tie is a review under other statutes or policies. If the Government supports the transaction with public financing, however,
the review must be prepared. See id. § 3-4).
6. votes and other actions in international conferences and organizations;
and
7. disaster and emergency relief actions.
169. See Note, Agency Responses to Executive Order 12,114: A Comparison
and Implications, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 491-506 (1981).
170. See supra note 4.
171. E.g., BANNED PRODUCTS REPORT, supra note 35, at 24. The Banned
Products Report recommended that new legislation affecting the export provi-
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proponents may only manage to keep the issue alive. 17 2 A problem
with the current trend is that a policy providing little beyond total laissez-faire would result in a flood of raw data to foreign governments. These governments, in light of their capacities to digest
and utilize this information, 17 would derive little benefit from
this policy. A more demanding policy modeled upon the order
would not be appreciably more restrictive, but would provide foreign governments with more understandable product information.
Furthermore, this policy would be more attuned to the obligations and abilities of the United States as a leading exporter of
potentially hazardous merchandise.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE CONTROL OF
POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS MERCHANDISE

This Note has discussed the health problems resulting from the

sions of the statutes administered by EPA, FDA and the CPSC provide:
1. authority to collect data regarding export of items banned by the
agency, including evidence that the product conforms to the specifications
of the foreign purchaser, and violates no laws in the importing nation;
2. a requirement that exports be conspicuously labeled "For Export
Only," or a similar legend indicating that the product is not registered or
approved in the United States;
3. a requirement that the agency notify foreign governments of all actions
taken, and of all proposed actions which may affect importations into their
countries;
4. a requirement that the foreign authorities certify that they have received such notification;
5. the authority to totally ban export of extremely hazardous substances;
6. provisions for giving technical assistance and training to proper authorities in developing nations in order to increase their decision-making
capabilities.
Id. at 6. Proposals also have stressed a need for consideration of the impact of
United States exports on the global commons and third-party nations. See 1980
Hearings on Hazardous Products, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Faith T.
Campbell, Natural Resources Defense Council). Critics of current policy have
called for the establishment of a presumption of equivalent treatment for domestic and exported goods, in order to take advantage of the usually extensive
proceedings before any action concerning a given product. Id. at 224 (statement
of Public Citizen Health Research Group). A decision could be reached at some
later point concerning export, if a company or foreign government offered evidence that the product's use abroad was warranted. Id.
172. See telephone interview with Lenora Odeku, Office of Rep. Michael
Barnes (Feb. 1, 1982).
173. See supra note 4.
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use of potentially hazardous merchandise by unprepared consumers, 17 4 the inadequacy of this nation's regulatory system regarding
the use of this merchandise, 175 the inability of importing nations
to fully control the use of such products,'176 and the 'inability of
one nation's resolution of its own hazardous substance export
17
problem to solve what is fundamentally a worldwide problem. 7
Because it is unlikely that a solution to the problems posed by
the exportation of potentially hazardous merchandise will come
solely from the United States or the importing nations, an international scheme of consumer protection is called for. Policies and
requirements subscribed to by many nations would eliminate the
competitive disadvantage faced by an exporter based in a.nation
that has unilaterally enacted export restrictions. Uniform labeling
and information exchange rules would also result in more efficient
communication of product information, lessen incidents of redundant testing,' broaden the data base for product analysis,'1 9 and
reduce the need for individual labeling requirements.8 0 Finally,
an international system of product hazard notification would become more universally understood by consumers than would an
assortment of warnings.
The international community has developed various devices for

174. See supra text accompanying notes 16-70.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 71-124.

176. See supra note 4.
177. See supra note 53.

178. See supra note 4. A recent survey has indicated that the large majority
of chemical companies are too small to support in-house toxicity and ecotoxicity
testing facilities. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CHEMIcAL ASSESSMENT: INDUSTRY'S APPROACH TO SAFETY TESTING 1 61 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as OECD, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENT]. Consequently, such firms

must rely upon external laboratories, the impartiality and comprehensiveness of
which have been questioned. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1978, at Al, col. 5.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 268, 283-95.
180. Any efforts to this end are significant because of the lack of inherent
economic incentives for manufacturers to gather and disseminate full and "accurate product information to consumers. Unlike a traditional commodity, information cannot be readily protected by a system of property rights. Consumers
will not pay the optimum market value for goods they cannot "own," and the

market, therefore, will fail to generate an optimum supply. Consumption of any
information provided leaves such information's value largely intact and it be-

comes a "public" good. See Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATISTIC 387 (1954); Note, Promoting Product-Quality
Information:A ProposedLimited Antitrust Exemption for Producers,30 STAN.
L. REV. 563 (1978).
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dealing with potentially hazardous substances. This Note focuses
on three of these devices: The World Health Assembly Code of
Marketing for Breast-Milk Substitutes,"8 ' the European Eco8 3 to the 1967 Dinomic Community (EEC)i s2 sixth amendment"

rective controlling dangerous substances, 84 and information exchange systems conducted under the aegis of the United Nations,
chiefly the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Register of Potentially Toxic Compounds (IRPTC). Each
device falls at a different point on a continuum having at one end
strict limitation of commercial activity and at the other voluntary
guidelines for the enhancement of information exchange. The approach taken by each device reflects the legal nature of the parent
organization, the area of consumer protection with which it is
concerned, and the political undercurrents within the sponsoring
entity.
A.

The Infant Formula Marketing Code
1. Introduction

On May 21, 1981, after substantial investigation and debate, 18 5
the United Nations World Health Assembly approved an International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (Code).8 6
The Code was approved in the form of a recommendation to
member states. The House Foreign Affairs Committee conducted
hearings concerning the infant formula-issue early in 1980.187 Tes181. World Health Organization Code, supra note 6.
182. Four institutions comprise the European Economic Community (EEC):
the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. The special Council of Ministers is the decision making body of the EEC; it
establishes community policy through directives, regulations, and decisions. The
Commission is the executive branch of the EEC. It carries out directives of the

Council, makes recommendations for Council action, and participates in Council
meetings. The European Parliament consists of delegates; some may be elected
directly by each member state, who "deliberate" Council directives, report on
Commission proposals, and review the annual General Report. The Court of
Justice has three areas of competence. It functions as an international court, a
constitutional court, and an administrative tribunal. A. ROBERTSON, EuRoPEA
INSTITUTIONS 182-95 (3d ed. 1973).

183. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259) 10 (1979).
184. 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1967).

185. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
186. World Health Organization Code, supra note 6.
187. 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula, supra note 2.
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timony at those hearings by infant formula industry representatives indicated that a number of United States companies worked
with the WHO on development of the proposed code. 18 Under
mounting pressure from the WHO and other critics, companies
made substantial changes in their marketing practices.1 89 These
concessions, coupled with intensive lobbying by the International
Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI) at the WHO Geneva
meeting, 190 failed to defeat the resolution calling for the adoption
of the Code. Only the United States was convinced by the indus-

try's argument for self-regulation and voted against adoption of
the Code.19 1 Although the industry in the United States has obtained successful results from self-regulation, only three compa-

188. See, e.g., id. at 27 (statement of David 0. Cox, president, Ross
Laboratories).
189. See, e.g., id. at 73 (statement of John R. Stafford, executive president,
Home Products Corp.).
190. See 1981 WHO Code Hearings, supra note 19, at 97-98.
191. Prior to the WHA vote on the World Health Organization Code, supra
note 6, the United States publicly announced its intention to vote against adoption, claiming it had serious difficulty accepting the Code's provisions on constitutional, economic, and commercial grounds. 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54 (1981) (press
statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs, May 15, 1981); see infra text accompanying note 265. The Reagan administration also voiced opposition to the involvement of any United Nations
agency in the regulation of economic activity. 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54 (1981)
(press statement of M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, AID, May 18, 1981).
Government spokesmen further explained the United States position by linking
the infant formula code with other proposed U.N. actions, notably the U.N.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) proposal for a
"new world information order." These officials claimed that the infant formula
action was part of an attempt "to undermine respect for press integrity and legitimize attempts by the Soviet bloc and its allies to control the flow of information." Id. Following the Code's passage both the House and the Senate overwhelmingly approved resolutions expressing their "dismay" and "concern"
regarding the administration's stance. See H.R.J. Res. 287, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REc. 2962 (1981); S. 1193, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 6484
(1981). The United States vote was criticized widely. See 127 CONG. REc. 2953
(1981) (citation of editorials). The vote prompted the resignation of two AID
officials. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, at A6, col. 1. Criticism of the president's
nomination of Ernest Lefever for Secretary of State also heightened as a result
of the United States vote. Mr. Lefever's strong stance against the Code was attributed to his association with the Nestle Corporation, the major corporate target of activist proponents of the Code. Id. at A7, col. 1; id., May 22, 1981, at Al,
col. 1.
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nies 19 2 marketing infant formula in the Third World are based in
this country. No matter how favorable the experience of the
United States firms in matters of ethical business practice, no significant percentage of all companies marketing infant formula can
be reached through legislation by a single nation.
2. Provisions of the Code
The preamble to the Code indicates that the WHO's action is
based upon the "right of every child and every pregnant and lactating woman to be adequately nourished . .

,.".
The preamble

reviews the advantages of breast-feeding, acknowledges that social and economic forces affect breast-feeding, and admits that
1 94
there are situations in which recourse to formula is appropriate.
It closes by calling upon governments to take action 1in95 the marketing of breast-milk substitutes set out in the Code.
The Code focuses upon the sources of public information concerning formula. Extensive proscriptions begin with article 4,
which reiterates the Code's assignment of regulatory duties to individual governments."9 ' The article then lists the information
which is to be included on all informational or educational materials "dealing with the feeding of infants and intended to reach
1 97
pregnant women and mothers of infants and young children.

1

Article 5 of the Code imposes a strict ban on public advertising
of breast-milk substitutes. 198 The article also prohibits manufac192. Those companies are: Abbott/Ross Laboratories, Mead Johnson Nutritionals, and Wyeth International, Ltd. 1980 Hearings on Infant Formula, supra
note 2, at 41. Other nations where such firms operate include France, Mexico,
the Netherlands, England, Denmark, Hungary, Argentina, South Korea, Switzerland, Japan, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. Id.
193. World Health Organization Code, supra note 6, preamble at 10.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id. § 4.1, at 15.
197. Id. § 4.2, at 16. Such materials are to provide "clear information on: (1)
the benefits and superiority of breast feeding, (2) maternal nutrition, (3) the
negative effect of partial bottle/feeding or breast/feeding, (4) the problem of re-

suming breast/feeding following its abandonment, and (5) where needed, the
proper use of infant formula." If the manufacturer exercises its option to convey

information about the uses of its product on such materials, a discussion of the
social and financial implications and the health hazards involved in improper

infant feeding must be included. These materials may not, in addition, use "any
pictures or text which may idealize the use of breast milk substitutes." Id.
198. Id. § 5.1, at 16.
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turers and distributors from furnishing, directly or indirectly,
samples of formula to its most likely users.19 The article continues its assault on infant formula promotion by prohibiting marketing personnel from contacting those whom the drafters feel are
most susceptible to their persuasions. 0 0
Article 6 begins by encouraging health authorities in individual
nations to promote the objectives of the Code.2 0 ' It prohibits
manufacturer access to health care facilities for the purposes of
promoting products within the Code's scope, 02 except as provided by article 7, and attacks direct consumer contact by company representatives.0 3 Article 6, however, does permit manufacturers to offer donations or low price sales of products or
equipment to institutions, but only the company name or logo,
not the brand name of a formula product, may accompany the
equipment or products.20 4
Article 7 deals with contact between company representatives
and health care professionals. It extends the prohibition found in
article 4205 against creating the impression that formula feeding is
superior to breast-feeding to the professional sphere. 206 Financial
or material inducement to health care professionals by manufacturers or distributors is flatly prohibited. 207 Samples of formula
may be given only for "professional evaluation or research at the
institutional level. ' 208 Health care professionals may not then
turn over samples of the product to pregnant women and other
potential customers.20 9
Article 8 is limited to practices entirely within the trade. Quotas for sale of articles within the scope of the Code are forbidden
and formula sales are to be excluded from calculations of bonus
199. Id. § 5.2, at 16.
200. Sections 5.3-5.5 detail the prohibitions of the preceding sections in an

attempt to eliminate consumer exposure to point-of-sale advertising, giving of
samples, and other promotional devices such as "special displays, discount coupons, premiums, special sales, loss/leaders, and tie-in sales," as well as gifts of
utensils which may promote bottle feeding. Id. §§ 5.3-.5, at 17.
201. Id. § 6.1.
202. Id. § 6.2.
203. Id. §§ 6.3-.5 at 17-18.
204. Id. §§ 6.6-.8, at 18.
205. Id. § 4.2, at 16.
206. Id. § 7.2, at 19.
207. Id. § 7.3, at 19.
208. Id. § 7.4, at 19.
209. Id.
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payments to sales personnel. 210 Unless specifically requested by
authorities within an individual nation, company representatives
are barred from direct contact with consumers through "educational" functions.2 1 '
Article 9 applies the minimum information requirements contained in article 4212 to all product labeling, by requiring that a
"clear, conspicuous, and easily readable and understandable" version of those same notices accompanies each container of
formula. 213
Article 10 is the only section of the Code dealing with the product itself. It refers to the standards of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission as parameters for evaluating the composition of infant food products.21 4
Article 11, the final article of the Code, contains recommendations for implementing and monitoring the Code. It gives primary
responsibility in these areas to the individual governments and
encourages them to cooperate with WHO and other UN agencies.2" 5 This article also allocates responsibility to formula manufacturers, distributors, nongovernmental oganizations, and professional groups. 2 16 The Code concludes by requesting that each
member state report annually to WHO's Director General regarding the Code's implementation and prepare a biennial summary
21 7
of these reports on behalf of the World Health Assembly.
3.

Legal Implications of the Infant Formula Code

The Executive Board of WHO advised adoption of the Infant
Formula Code as a recommendation rather than as a binding regulation. 218 The drafters reasoned that the "moral force of a unanimous recommendation" would be more useful than the passage of
a regulation, which because of its binding nature would garner
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. § 8.1.
Id. § 8.2, at 19-20.
See supra note 197.
World Health Organization Code, supra note 6, § 9.2, at 20.
Id. 9 10.2, at 21.
Id. 9 11.1.
Id. §§ 11.2-.5, at 22.
Id. §9 11.6-.7.
Introductory statement by the representative of the Executive Board to

the 34th World Health Assembly on the Subject of the Draft International Code
of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, May 20, 1981, reprinted in id. annex 3

at 32.
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fewer votes in the World Health Assembly. 19 The Executive
Board's "plea for consensus"2 20 underscores the leading issue surrounding this and similar codes: the extent to which these codes
affect legal relationships and duties despite their nonbinding
nature.
Codes of conduct for international commercial behavior have
recently increased in number and scope.2 21 The development of
these codes can be traced, most recently, to efforts by the "Group
of 77 ''222 to conform global economic relationships to a "new international economic order."2'2 3

219. Id., reprinted at 35.
220. Id.
221. While codes of conduct are now developed primarily within the United
Nations, such codes have been produced by other international organizations.

E.g., INTERNATIONAL

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL IN-

(1972). The United Nations agencies have given birth to a number of
such codes. At its second session, the Commission on Transnational Corporations organized an Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations. 61 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5),
10-17, U.N. Doc.
E/C 10/16 (1977). The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) has proposed two major codes of conduct. The most recent, a draft
code on restrictive business practices, has been said to contain "an obvious bias
against the behavior of developed nations' enterprises . . . ." ABA Antitrust
Section, International Trade Committee, Report on the Proposed UNCTAD
Code on Restrictive Business Practices,49 ANTITRUST L.J. 399, 402 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Antitrust Section]. UNCTAD has also conducted a major
portion of the work on a Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. See
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, U.N. Doc. TC/CODE
TOT/33 (1981). See generally Symposium: TransnationalTechnology: Current
Problems and Solutions for the CorporatePractitioner,14 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1981) (analyzing select aspects of the technology transfer process).
222. The "Group of 77" coalesced in 1974 at the first session of UNCTAD in
Geneva. The bloc currently includes approximately 120 countries and has been
identified as the "south," or the "less developed countries." Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 445, 445-46 & n.1
(1981).
223. The "new international order" proclaims the duties owed by developed
nations to their less developed counterparts and demands redistribution of the
economic wealth of the world in favor of less developed nations. See Fatouros,
The International Law of the New InternationalEconomic Order: Problems
VESTMENT

and Challenges for the United States, 17

WILLAMETTE

L.

REV.

93 (1980). Its

arguments often echo those used by promoters of affirmative action within the
United States. Id. at 100. The program aims to enhance control by developing
nations over their own economies, encourage indigenous economic development,
create an international system of assistance to those countries, and promote
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That which is nonbinding, however, cannot give rise to legal liability such as claims for damages or judicial remedies. 2 24 Develop-

ing nations argue that mere guidelines cannot satisfy their needs.
This position stems from apprehension about the preeminence of
multinational enterprises in the world economy 225 and an appreci-

ation of the barriers standing between the status quo and
increased corporate regulation in the Third World. As might be
expected, industrialized countries generally regard the multinational corporation as a positive force in world economic development. 226 These nations are thus of the opinion that the Code and
others like it should serve only as ethical guidelines without creating legal rights or obligations for states or commercial
enterprises.227
It cannot be denied that the moral suasion of the Code, backed
by an almost unanimous consensus, has significant impact. This
unanimity also indicates the possibility that the Code may become customary international law. 228 Analysis of any code of conpreferential, nonreciprocal treatment for those nations in matters of international trade. See Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) (6th Special Sess.) at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) (6th
Special Sess.) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
224. Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 300 (1977). The State Department, pursuant to
the Case Act of 1972, 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1976), must transmit to Congress all
international agreements other than treaties no later than 60 days after their
entry into force. The State Department's criteria for defining an international
agreement under that Act include a requirement that the parties intend their
agreement to be legally binding, beyond any political or moral weight it may
carry. Schachter, supra at 302 (citing Memorandum by the State Department
Legal Advisor, Case Act Procedures and Department of State Criteria for Deciding What Constitutes an International Agreement (Mar. 12, 1976)).
225. Origins of the political assault on multinationals may be traced to more
than their role within international business. See R. VERNON, STORM OVER THE
MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES 145-46 (1977).
226. See Review of the 1976 Declarationand Decisions on InternationalInvestment and MultinationalEnterprises,at 5, reprintedin ABA Antitrust Section, supra note 221, at 412 n.30.
227. Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or
Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices,72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 254 (1978).
228.

See Joyner, supra note 222, at 457.
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duct, therefore, should not stop with the conclusion that it must
be legally enforceable.2 2 9
Despite strenuous resistance, a large number of multinational
corporations have altered practices and policies under pressures
expressed by a "voluntary" code of conduct. The WHO Code is
too recent to evaluate in terms of its behavioral effect on corporations. Its precedential value, however, extends far beyond its benefit to the health of young children. Its impact as a voluntary behavior control device has not been overlooked by opponents of
the United Nations involvement in the regulation of economic
activity."'

B.

The EEC Sixth Amendment
1. Provisions

In 1979 the Council of Ministers of the EEC culminated over
twelve years of work by passing the sixth amendment to the 1967
Directive2 3 1 controlling dangerous substances. 2 2 The sixth
229. The UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group on the Transfer of Technology, for example, was instructed to draft its code "without prejudice to its legal
nature." U.N. Doc. TD/AC 1/4, at 2 (1976); see Davidow & Chiles, supra note
227, at 249.
230. See 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 255 (1981) (statement by Assistant Secretary
Abrams before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 20, 1981); see also WHO Code Hearings, supra
note 19, at 87.
231. Sixth Amendment, supra note 183. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259) 10
(1979).
232. EEC regulation of dangerous substances began in 1965, with the introduction in the Council of Proposed Directives 179 and 180. See Alignment of
Rules Concerning Dangerous Substances, European Economic Community Press
Release IP (65) 89 (May 12, 1965). Two years later, the Council adopted the
substance of those proposals into the 1967 Directive. This Directive based upon
broad provisions of the Treaty of Rome dealing with worker safety (articles 2
and 117) and barriers to trade (article 101). See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15, 54, 61 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The 1967 Directive was comparatively limited in its scope.
It excluded all preparations, i.e. mixtures of two or more substances, 10 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 10 (1967) (preamble), and exports to non-EEC countries. Id. art. 1, para. 3. Implementation of the 1967 Directive took four years,
and it still lacked the compliance of Ireland and Luxembourg as of 1978. European Report No. 566: Internal Market 5 (Dec. 9, 1978). From 1972 until 1979, a
number of directives were issued concerning such specific areas as solvents, certain technical standards, national environmental legislation, damages from pollution, and revisions in the 1967 Directive's wording. See Recent Development,
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amendment revises the scope, notification, packaging requirements, and implementation provisions of the Directive to more
effectively regulate and collect information on the problems of
trading hazardous substances.233
The scope of the amended Directive includes all chemicals
manufactured within EEC states and intended for export to foreign nations. 234 Exempt from the Directive are medicinal products, narcotics and radioactive substances, transport of substances by common carrier,2 35 certain aerosols, explosives, 3 6
foodstuffs, waste substances, and materials in transit which are
under custom supervision.23 7
The amended Directive's definition of "substances" expands
the scope of the 1967 Directive. "Substances" now includes chemical elements and compounds in either a manufactured or natural
state.238 Furthermore, added to the existing classes are carcinogens, teratogens, mutagens, very toxic substances, extremely flammable substances, and substances dangerous to the
2 39
environment.
A broad "grandfather" provision effectively limits the
premarket notification provisions for substances which entered

the market after September 18, 1981.240 The notification process
mandates that at least forty-five days before introducing a new

substance into the market, the manufacturer must submit to an

The Sixth Amendment: Toxic Substance Control in the EEC, 12 LAW & POL'Y
Bus. 461, 466-70 (1980).
233. See infra text accompanying notes 241-51.
234. Compare 100 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1967) (preamble) ("to
protect man and the environment against potential risks which could arise from
the placing on the market of new dangerous substances") with the purposes expressed by NEPA, supra note 159. The preamble also outlines the amendment's
subsequent methodology.
235. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259) 10 (1979) (art. 1).
236. Id. art. 1, paras. 3, 4.
237. Id. art. 1, para. 2; see Council Directive of 20 March 1978 21 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 84) 43 (1978) (toxic and dangerous waste); Council Directive of 15
July 1975, 18 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 194) 39 (1975) (waste).
238. 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 259) 10 (1979) arts. 1-2, para. 1(c)-(e).
239. Id. art. 2, para. 2(e),(f),(k)-(n). Briefly, carcinogenic chemicals cause
cancer, mutagens induce inheritable changes in genetic material, and teratogens
induce non-transmittable birth defects.
240. Id. art. 5, para. 2. Notification procedures apply to substances, even
those combined in "preparations," but not to preparations themselves. See id.
art. 5, para. 1; see also id. arts. 6-8.

IN INT'L
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EEC member state a proposed classification, labeling, and analysis of the substance's adverse effects, precautions needed, and
other technical information. 241 The member state receiving notification must forward a copy of that information and any related
studies to the commission 24 2 for distribution to all of the member
states for examination. The originating member state has fortyfive days to oppose the marketing of that substance.24 3 Article 8
exempts from the notification provision small amounts of substances which are to be used only for market or laboratory re24 5
search2 44 and certain other specific compounds.
Article 7 requires each member state to appoint "competent
authority" to examine new substance applications. 246 Redundant
testing is avoided by providing that approval by one member
state constitutes approval in each member state.2 47 Each authority has some discretion in requesting either additional test data
from the manufacturer, or changes in classification or labeling
through the Technical Adaptation Committee.2 4 The competent
authority in each state may, as provided by article 7, make suggestions concerning that substance to the originating state. Disagreement between any two member states on such points may be
resolved by the Commission. 249 This system of cross-checks
largely eliminates any incentive for producers to "forum shop" for
lenient authorities.
Classification and packaging requirements are set out in articles
13 through 18. Regardless of whether a substance is classified as
"old" or "new, ' 25 0 if a manufacturer improperly classifies, packages, or labels a substance it will be banned from the market, despite an exemption from the notification procedures.2 5 1
Implementation provisions, articles 20, 21, and 22, provide that
no member state may restrict from its home market any dangerous substance once it has fulfilled the requirements of the amend-

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

6, at 12 (quoting Dr. Louis Slesin).
9.
6.
8, para. 1.

art. 7, para. 1.
art. 22.
art. 7, paras. 1, 2.
art. 10, para. 2.
art. 13, para. 2; see supra note 240.
arts. 15-18.
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ment.2 52 This provision thus eliminates some nontariff trade
barriers.
2.

The Sixth Amendment's Implications for Export
Regulation

The United States passage of TOSCA 2 3 in 1976 presented a
potentially difficult trade barrier to the EEC, and encouraged the
EEC to negotiate with the EPA.25 4 European manufacturers were
fearful that TOSCA would become the model for a v~riety of national hazardous substance laws within the European Community. 255 Conflicts between the EPA and the EEC in both scientific 258 and legal circles 25 7 confront both parties with a need for

252. Id. arts. 20-22.
253. See supra note 116.
254. European Report No. 493: Business Brief, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1978). The
EEC and United States shares of the $122.5 billion world chemical market in
1979 were, respectively, just over half for the EEC, and 14% for the United
States. Harrison, Toxic Substances Legislation, Bus. EuR. May-June 1981, at

11.
255. The coverage of TOSCA is more complete. It does not exempt any "old"
chemicals as does the sixth amendment. 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (b) (1976) (inventory
of existing chemicals). TOSCA, however, requires manufacturer testing only
when the EPA has determined that the product may present an unreasonable
risk of injury to humans or the environment, and that existing data is inadequate. Id. § 2603(a). TOSCA's premarket notification provision, id., § 2604, only
requires a relatively simple summary of information from manufacturers, which
is estimated by the EPA to cost between $1200 and $8900 per chemical. Id. §
2604; see Recent Development, supra note 232, at 494. In contrast, costs for
EEC premarket compliance may run as high as $55,000 per substance. See
EEC's Toxic Watch, ECONOMIST, July 21, 1979, at 78. The EPA's pre-manufacturing notices have been termed "a joke" because such notices lack significant
test data. Harrison, supra note 254, at 12 (quoting Dr. Louis Slesin).
256. Contrasting approaches to gathering information present an obvious
difference. The United States has argued that the sixth amendment's strict requirements lead to inadequate testing of some chemicals and unnecessary testing of others. See [1979 Current Reports] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 885. Establishment of standard "good laboratory practices," which the United States
has advocated, is also a controversial point. Id.
257. The gap between EEC and EPA understandings of negotiation technique is illustrative. When EEC representatives in the United States have proposed off-the-record discussions at meals or parties, EPA spokesmen have had
to inform them that "[although] it doesn't engender good relations if we say we
can't talk to you about some things ...

we are very, very sensitive to ...

the

risk of the entire rulemaking being invalidated or remanded." Transcript of Proceedings, EPA/European Community Discussions on Toxic Substances in Wash-
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harmonization. Although both the EEC nations and the United
States, as members of OECD, are under some pressure to reach a
satisfactory arrangement,2 58 the current conclusion, at least
within the chemical industry, is that "[t]hings are in substantial
'
disarray."259
A common ground may be found, however, in the EEC's sixth
amendment approach and that offered by NEPA26' and Executive
Order 12,114.261 All emphasize an in-depth review of potential en-

vironmental impacts, although sharply limited in scope. Both the
EEC and NEPA, although covering entirely different subjects,
achieve some certainty in warning of threats to persons and the
environment, without sacrificing room for flexibility in decision
making. Multilateral participation in such a system of information exchange and processing could provide a scientifically workable and politically acceptable conduit between developed nations
concerning potentially hazardous merchandise exports. This type
of system may, if applied to both those nations and to the Third
World, avoid the tensions engendered by more rigid strategies
such as the WHO infant formula code. Loss of the certainty inherent in a code of conduct may be offset by the broader cooperation encouraged by a less stringent approach.
C.

United Nations Information Exchange Systems
1. Introduction

A multilateral system of information exchange mitigates the
problems of exporting potentially hazardous merchandise. An informal method of information exchange has been adopted by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).262 There are, however, inherent inadequacies in both
ington, D.C., at 88-90 (Sept. 25, 1979).
258. See infra note 262.
259. Harrison, supra note 254, at 12 (quoting George S. Dominguez, director
of government relations CIBA-Geigy Corporation).
260. See supra note 159.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 158-73.
262. The OECD was established in 1960. Its current membership includes
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within those member states
the non-Communist world's twenty largest chemical manufacturing concerns are
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major multilateral conventions. Both the OECD and the EEC
agreements have no legal impact beyond their signatories. Furthermore, because both agreements have been formed by nations
that produce and export such products,263 any ,beneficial impact
will be largely confined to those nations.
Left with the shortcomings of the industrialized nations' unilateral and multilateral approaches, 26' developing- countries lack

safeguards against an enormous quantity of impdrted chemicals,
consumer products, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, a'd agricultural
products. Developing countries have thus relied upon the United
Nations for a solution. United Nations actions, such as the WHO
infant formula code, lack formal sanctions yet achieve highly desirable moral and political milestones for the Third World. The

based. See OECD, Chemical Assessment, supra note 184, at 8. The OECD's approach to the problem of hazardous products is multifaceted. In 1969, it created
a Committee on Consumer Policy (CCP), a voluntary system for product safety
information exchange. The CCP has been a means of hazard notification for
chain saws, asbestos, toys, and other children's products. The CCP contemplates
extension to such products as automobiles. Moreover, a refinement of the current system, and the incorporation of an export notification system is expected.
1980 Hearings on Hazardous Products,supra note 1, at 95 (statement of Susan
B. King, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission). In 1974 the OECD
Environment Committee recommended development of a comprehensive system
for data exchange regarding manufacture, import, and sales of chemicals. OECD
Council Recommendation, The Assessment of the Potential Environmental Effects of Chemicals, reprinted in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (1976). Following this recommendation, the OECD Chemicals Groups has considered a set of draft "guidelines"
in an attempt to coordinate disparate approaches of member states. See Guidelines in Respect of Procedure and Requirements for Anticipating the Effects of
Chemicals on Man and in the Environment, OECD Doc. ENV/CHEM./76.13
Rev. (1976). The OECD goal is a maximum of information exchange with a min-

imum of regulatory burden, stressing concerns such as the manufacturer's need
to protect trade secrets. See The International Control of Chemicals Within the
OECD Context, OECD Doc. ENV/CHEM 79.22 (1979).
263. In 1972 the Third World imported approximately $7.75 billion worth of
chemicals from OECD member nations. OECD, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENT, supra
note 178, at 9.
264. Bilateral agreements have been common among developed nations for
promoting cooperation and reducing each party's testing costs. These arrangements are primarily of use to major producing or importing nations, and may
focus on rather specialized concerns. E.g., UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIEs: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 60 (1976)
(agreement between the United States and Brazil pertaining to the sanitary
quality of chocolate liqueur imports).
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United Nations has also been the forum for passage of coordinated information exchange systems. This sharing of information
treads much more lightly upon the political and commercial toes
of industrialized nations than do the extensive demands of items
akin to the WHO infant formula code.26 5 Too often, however, the

265. United States opponents of the World Health Organization Code, supra
note 7, have repeatedly, although vaguely, raised the spectre of antitrust and
first amendment violations implicit in this nation's possible approval of the
Code. E.g., 1981 WHO Code Hearings, supra note 19, at 39, 86 (testimony of
former Senator Sam Ervin, lobbyist for the Grocery Manufacturers Association).
It has also been viewed as part of an attempt to "legitimize attempts by the
Soviet bloc and its allies to control the flow of information." 81 DEP'T ST. BULL.
54 (1981) (statement by M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for International Development). A closer analysis of the Code reveals, however, little basis for the legal, if not political, allegations. See Letter from William F. Baxter,
Assistant Attorhey General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice to
Juan Del Real, Acting General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services (April 8, 1981), reprinted in 1981 WHO Code Hearings,supra note 19, at
66. First, the Code is entirely voluntary under the WHO constitution. See supra
text accompanying notes 18-21. Moreover, the Department of Justice concluded
that the Code's "potentially broad or otherwise ambiguous terms ...

make it

difficult to assess the seriousness of these [antitrust and first amendment] questions; this would turn on just how the Code is interpreted and how and by whom
it is implemented." 1981 WHO Code Hearings, supra note 19, at 67. Given this
latitude for expression, and the Code's emphasis on implementation "appropriate to [each nation's] social and legislative framework," the Department of Justice determined that the United States could vote for its approval. See also 22
U.S.C. § 290(d) (1976) (United States Government does not commit itself to any
WHO policies or practices).
In terms of the Code's antitrust implications, article 11.2 of the Code encourages manufacturers and other groups to carry out its measures; therefore suggesting the antitrust pitfall of concerted action. This obvious implication would
likely be avoided assidously by United States firms within their "social and legislative framework." Code-approved functions by foreign nations should not, according to the Code's own scheme, run afoul of United States antitrust laws.
That plan calls for enactment of national legislation towards the Code's ends.
Current concepts of sovereign immunity in this country dictate judicial avoidance of such sovereign enactments so clearly lacking in any commercial overtones. See International Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,
1979-2 T. Cas. (CCH) 62,868 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1979), (construing the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604 (1976)). Judicial application
of the Act of State doctrine to the question of the extraterritorial reach of domestic antitrust laws would reinforce this conclusion. See Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). First amendment issues
are raised by the Code's extensive restriction of advertising. While this "commercial speech" is a protected right, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia,
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less developed nations are unprepared to use the data given to
them unless it is in a highly digested form.2 66 Their concern, however, is evidenced by the increase in the number of developing
countries which have established governmental agencies to deal
with questions of environmental management from 11 in 1972 to
102 in 1980.267
This Note will review two of the more established and potentially far reaching informational structures 268 established by the
United Nations: the World Health Organization and the International Register of Potentially Toxic Compounds (IRPTC).

421 U.S. 809 (1975), it is not free from governmental regulation. See Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Current restrictions on the advertising of distilled alcohol and tobacco products on
television provide distinct examples of advertising restrictions reasonably calculated to serve a public need, and thereby valid. Finally, it should be noted that
all first amendment objections pertain solely to the question of congressional
enactment of the Code, not to issues surrounding a positive United States vote
on the Code resolution.
266. See supra note 4.
267. 1981 Report on Information Exchange, supra note 4, at 3.
268. Such agencies include:
1. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), which has undertaken development of the Earthwatch system to provide warnings of environmental risks. Earthwatch is composed of the Global Environmental
Monitoring System, the International Referral Service, and the IRPTC.
Alston, InternationalRegulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 397,
411-12 (1978). UNEP also manages INFOTERRA, an access center for
over 8500 sources of environmental data from 112 countries. 1981 Report
on Information Exchange, supra note 4, at 15.
2. The Codex Alimentarius Commission, established in 1964, implements
the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization/WHO Food Standards Program. Standards concerning pesticide hazard differentiation have been set
for 46 chemicals. Id. at 17.
3. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has established the International Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Alert System for rapid
dispersal of information on occupational hazards via 97 nationally designated entities, and as of 1981 had issued five such alerts. Id. at 15. The
ILO also maintains a computerized data base of published material on occupational safety matters. Id. at 16.
4. The International Agency for Research on Cancer, a component of
WHO, has attempted to coordinate international efforts in cancer research. The IARC published monographs contain its independently formulated scientific opinions, chiefly in the field of environmental carcinogenesis. Alston, supra at 416.
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2.

The World Health Organization

In 1962 the World Health Organization undertook the task of
investigating techniques for establishing standards for clinical
and pharmacological evaluation of drugs, promoting regular exchange of information about the safety and efficacy of drugs, and
securing prompt transmission to national health authorities of
new information concerning serious side effects of drugs.2 6" Since
that time, the WHO has issued reports on various principles of
toxicological testing and assessment of bioavailability, mutagenicity, and carcinogenicity.2 7 0 The WHO also has established the
International Drug Monitoring Program, the Drug Information
Circulars and Bulletin, and its Certification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International
Commerce. 1
The International Drug Monitoring Program, based in Uppsala,
Sweden, aids in the early detection and reporting of suspected
adverse drug reactions.7 2 This program provides an inherent advantage over any single national monitoring system, in that the
sample population for detection of uncommon post-clinical reactions can be tremendously expanded. In 1981 twenty-two countries were participating in the program. 7 3 More than 140,000 reports have been filed, a figure increasing by approximately 2000
each month.
In 1963 the World Health Assembly (WHA) requested member
states to convey to the WHO notice of any legal actions taken
concerning a drug-decisions to deny or restrict approval of new
drugs or limit the availability of ones already in use.27 5 Currently,
the WHO Drug Information Circulars convey notices about regulatory actions taken with regard to internationally available products. 7 6 The quarterly Drug Information Bulletin consists of an
269. Economic and Social Council, Report of the Secretary-General, Annex
II (Preliminary list item 12) at IL, U.N. Doc. A/36/255 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as ECOSOC Report].
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1-2.
273. Id. at 1.
274. Id.
275. World Health Assembly, Res. 16.36 (1963), reprinted in 1 WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE ExEcUTIVE BOARD 139 (cumulative ed. 1973).

276. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex H, at 3. See also 1978 Hear-
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edited commentary on the actions reported in the Circulars." 7
The WHO Certification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International Commerce (WHO Certification Scheme) tries to overcome the disparity in national quality
control procedures by documenting the export of drugs falling
short of the exporter's domestically imposed standards." 8
Adopted in 1975,279 the WHO Certification Scheme now enrolls
280
fifty-four countries through designated national authorities.
Those authorities are responsible for certifying, upon request of
an interested state, whether the export in question is sold on the
domestic market, and whether quality control procedures used by
its manufacturer accord with the standards recommended by
WHO.2 8 1 A participating state must ensure that its pharmaceuti-

cal industry utilizes appropriate testing measures and manufacturing practices.282
3.

The InternationalRegister of Potentially Toxic
Compounds

The International Register of Potentially Toxic Compounds
(IRPTC), was initiated in 1972 at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment. 8 3 The IRPTC was integrated into
Earthwatch in 1976.284 Its capabilities were reinforced in 1978

through finalization of UNEP's outline for a system of national

ings on Banned Products, supra note 4, at 115-31.

277. ECOSOC Report, supra 269, Annex II, at 3 (the FDA informed the
WHO as to changes in notice requirements and approval for the following four
drugs: doramphenicol, phenformin, azaribine and diethylstilbestrol).
278. Id. at 2.
279.

World Health Assembly, Res. 28.65 (1975), reprinted in 2 HANDBOOK OF

RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE ExEcu-

TIVE BOARD

77 (4th ed. 1981).

280. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex II, at 2.
281. Id.
282. Id. Annex III, at 3.
283. The IRPTC is to encompass "a collection of available scientific data on
the environmental behavior of the most important man-made chemicals and
...production figures of the potentially most harmful ... together with their
pathways from factory via utilization to ultimate disposal or recirculation." Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, chap. II,
recommendation 74, subpara. (e), U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972).
284. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex I at 1. See supra note 268 for
an explanation of Earthwatch.
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correspondents,2 85 workshops,2 86 and information access systems.
The IRPTC performs its duties by a number of mechanisms:
(1) Compiling data profiles for chemical production,
toxicity, and treatment of
use, environmental pathways,
2 s7
chemical poisoning.
(2) Assembling legal data profiles, which review legal
and administrative restrictions imposed in the manufacturing country on potentially toxic compounds."" This
profile has thus far published national and international
recommendations for the control of approximately 200
chemicals selected from the IRPTC's working list of priority chemicals.2 89
(3) The IRPTC Data Register consists of a global network of correspondents for the purpose of data collection and exchange of information about an extensive
number of chemicals. 290 The IRPTC is presently in the
process of completing data profiles for only a limited
number of chemicals, with special attention to those
hazards reported by developing countries.2 9 1 As of 1981,
the Register covered 350 chemicals, including 160 used
in agriculture.2 92
(4) The IRPTC Query-Response Service is backed by
29 3
computerized bibliographic files and other references
and, when necessary, the resources of WHO, the International Occupational Safety and Health Information
Centre of IL0,29 4 and IRPTC's national correspondents.
Since 1976 the service has dealt with questions from
United Nations agencies, governments, industry, and in-

285. As of 1981, 89 countries had appointed national correspondents. IRPTC
staff members regularly visit those correspondents to coordinate efforts within
IRPTC and development of similar national registers. ECOSOC Report, supra
note 269, Annex I, at 4.
286. See, e.g., Report of the Workshop for National Correspondents in Asia
and Pacific Region WS/AP/18 (Aug. 1-3, 1979).
287. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex I, at 3.
288. Id. The Legal Data Profiles are part of the whole Data Profile system.
289. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 287.
290. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex I, at 3.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 4.
294. See supra note 268 for an explanation of the ILO's functions.
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dividuals on a wide range of technical matters.295
V.

CONCLUSION

The dangers posed by exports of potentially hazardous merchandise will continue to accelerate. United States and world exports of chemicals, consumer products, pesticides, and drugs continue to increase at significant rates. 2 6 Rapid population growth,
particularly in developing nations, drains natural resources and
increases demand for these hazardous products. Continued discoveries of toxic properties in existing chemicals and innovation
of new products and substances 2 7 increases the difficulties faced
by the unprepared consumer.
Multinational information exchange systems offer one workable
solution. Sufficiently broad information systems are difficult to
create, and cumbersome to manage. 9 8 Producers are often reticent to provide data and may prefer to settle product safety questions by voluntary agreement with the producer's government
rather than through widely publicized multinational enactments.
Disparate international technical standards and the varying quality of test data results in government reluctance to accept results
of foreign analysis. 29 The scope of the potentially hazardous merchandise problem demands efforts to launch and to maintain
more uniform, long-term approaches.
295. ECOSOC Report, supra note 269, Annex I, at 4.
296. See HSEP Report, supra note 3, at 7808 (United States total exports
were $62.5 billion in 1970 or 6.4% of GNP. By 1978, those figures were $205
billion and 9.7% respectively); OECD Chemical Assessment, supra note 814, %7
(world consumption and production of chemicals grew 9.5% per year in volume
from 1962 to 1972).
297. It has been estimated that there are about 3.5 million known chemical
compounds. UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1976).

298. The Codex Alimentarius Commission illustrates this point. Since its establishment in 1967 it has enlisted 114 member states. It has proposed 130 international food standards, some 900 international pesticide residue tolerances,
and 14 international codes of practice. Despite its flexible provisions for national
acceptance, by 1976 only 47 countries had either fully or with qualifications accepted a number of the food standards, and only 25 had so committed themselves to several pesticide standards. G. Kermode, InternationalAspects of the
Codex Alimentarius 3 (paper presented at seminar on U.S. Codex Alimentarius,
Washington, D.C. Aug. 2-3, 1976), cited in Alston, supra note 268, at 433.
299. Cf. Ragolia, The FDA's Acceptance of Foreign Clinical Data, 30 FOOD,
DRUG & CosMETIcs L.J. 433, 434 (1975).
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No nation can accurately predict the costs and benefits of a
new product in a geographically and socially remote nation. Unilateral government action is more likely to result in a paternalistic imposition of policies and preferences of that nation upon the
importing nation's consumers. An international system for exchange of technical and regulatory information does hold promise
of political, administrative, and technical survival, although the
current fragmented approach is inefficient. Public awareness of
the responsibility of producing nations and the slowly increasing
information handling capabilities of the developing nations may,
however, portend greater recourse to these systems.
Eric Shuman

